Our growing ability to decode and re-encode genomes has enabled rapid responses to emerging diseases, but also potentially empowers would-be bio-terrorists. It is urgent that we develop national and international policies to regulate this dual use technology to ensure its benefits and minimize its risks....
Fearing a monopoly on standard biological parts,...bioconservative organizations have called for openness through public databases for sharing information. Several researchers in the field have responded by creating BioBricks and The Registry of Standard Biological Parts. Other groups have created The Science Commons and Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS)....
Ironically, the same bioconservative organizations that called for openness in public databases now realize in some cases sharing information is not always in the best interest of public health. Due to the dual use nature of synthetic biology, the placement of genetic code of lethal pathogens in public databases compromises biosecurity....
Now that scientists established a proof of principle for creating a deadly virus from genetic code, the only thing left for evildoers is a how-to manual. As synthetic biology became more in popular literature, a persistent journalist from Britain decided to investigate how easy it would be to order the biological parts necessary for creating a deadly virus.
In 2006, the science reporter with The Guardian contacted synthetic biology pioneer Drew Endy, formerly at MIT and now at Stanford, for advice on the story. In a dialogue with Endy, they discussed a partial sequence of the smallpox virus which was slightly altered for safety reasons to see what would happen. The reporter ordered the partial sequence via the internet and had it delivered to the Guardian headquarters.
In this case, the supplier was not aware the sequence coded for a destructive organism. As part of self governance, the sybio community has attempted to close the loophole by boycotting DNA synthesizing companies that do not screen their orders for sequences placed on a list determined to be public health concerns to prevent rogue groups from creating a biological weapon....
So, who is the real enemy; capitalists, nature, the media, or militarization by rogue groups? ...
Comment. I already accept that patient privacy takes priority over OA. Hence I don't support OA to medical records without either anonymization or consent. In the right case I can accept that security also takes priority over OA. But I'm not sure this is the right case. A panel of the US National Research Council (NRC) considered exactly the case Mayes discusses --OA to genome data on pathogens-- and decided that the benefits outweighed the risks. In September 2004 it justified its assessment in a book-length report, which Mayes does not cite. (Also see my 2005 article on the NRC report.) I'm ready to believe that fabrication techniques have changed significantly since 2004, and that they will continue to lower the barriers to fabricating viruses from genomic blueprints. On the other hand, the NRC report rested on several arguments independent of the state of technology in 2004, for example, that suppressing factual knowledge about nature is ineffective, and that access to pathogen genome data is necessary to protect public health, especially in the face of bioterror. I'd like to see someone redo the NRC assessment in light of changing technology, or assess changing technology in light of the NRC's policy arguments.
Posted by
Peter Suber at 6/08/2009 01:10:00 PM.
The open access movement:
Putting peer-reviewed scientific and scholarly literature
on the internet. Making it available free of charge and
free of most copyright and licensing restrictions.
Removing the barriers to serious research.
I recommend the OA tracking project (OATP) as the best way to stay on top of new OA developments. You can read the OATP feed on a blog-like web page or subscribe to it by RSS, email, or Twitter. You can also help build the feed by tagging new developments you encounter.
