Open Access News

News from the open access movement


Thursday, April 17, 2008

9/11 overreaction has stifled access to science

Jonathan Pfeiffer, The Halfway House Between Science and Secrets: An Interview With Bruce Schneier on Science and Security, Science Progress, March 19, 2008.  (Thanks to FGI.)  Excerpt:

A recent National Research Council report [Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World, National Academies Press, 2007] recognizes that the 9/11 attacks provoked counter-productive security measures that stifle access to fruitful scientific research....

Science Progress:  The National Research Council is concerned that the federal government has categorized too many scientific research results after 9/11 as “sensitive but unclassified.” Can you explain what this term means and why this is a problem?

Bruce Schneier: It’s kind of a weasel term in the U.S. government and military....“Sensitive but unclassified” is a halfway house between public information and classified information. It’s not really a secret, but someone somewhere doesn’t want someone else to know, so it becomes a gray area. The rules are a lot sloppier, there’s a lot more leeway, and more and more–not only in science, but everywhere–information that used to be given to the public as a matter of course becomes “sensitive but unclassified.” It could be phone directories; it could be hours of operation for buildings; it could be locations of polling places. And a lot of scientific data, information, and knowledge --stuff that is used by the scientific community, used by businesses, used by everybody-- gets stuck in this halfway house between secret and open. It’s a form of secrecy, and it’s a form of stifling information sharing. And where it affects scientists is that science thrives on information sharing. Science works because one person’s research becomes another person’s footnotes....

SP: The NRC is now recommending the full implementation of NSDD-189, Ronald Reagan’s 1985 order to keep unclassified research results open and available to the maximum possible extent. Do you have any concerns about referring, in the world of post 9/11 policymaking, to Cold War-era policies?

Schneier: Well, the devil is in the details. That is a good document if it really does say that we should make research open and available. I don’t care when it was written....

SP: You have argued before that the value of secrecy should be judged on a case-by-case basis. However, the federal government also needs broad principles and guidelines for regulating scientific publishing. What can the government do?

Schneier: The first principle is that openness should be assumed, and that we should strive for openness wherever possible....

PS:  I discuss similar issues, and even an earlier report on the same topic by the National Research Council, in a September 2005 article, Reflections on 9/11, four years later.