Commercialization and Public–Private Partnership in Jordan

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ABSTRACT In 1997 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan enunciated major policy changes in the water sector, emphasizing water demand management and a major role for the private sector. The government embarked upon a privatization programme, the goal being to orient Jordan’s economy more towards the private sector and best present Jordan to the international financial community. The specific objectives of the programme include increasing the efficiency of enterprises, consolidating public finance, attracting private investment into the economy and deepening the financial markets. The Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ), one of the authorities of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI), entered into a management contract with an international water services operator in April 1999 for the management of all water-related services within the governorate of Amman. MWI and WAJ have been considering other options for water and wastewater services in other governorates of Jordan. They concluded a management contract for the northern area and Wadi Mousa in the south, a governmental company for Aqaba and build, operate and transfer for As-Samar wastewater treatment plant.

Country Situation: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Basic Data

Jordan is 91 880 km² in area located between latitudes 20.5° to 30.5° north and longitudes 35° to 39.5° east (as shown in Figure 1). It lies within the semi-arid climatic zone and has a typical Mediterranean short rainy winter and long dry summer. Annual precipitation varies with location and topography, but ranges from 50 mm in the desert to 600 mm in the north-west highlands; this means that 91.4% of the total area receives an average annual rainfall less than 200 mm, whereas 3% of its area receives an annual rainfall greater than 300 mm.

The consequences of this situation led to a large imbalance between supply and demand, continued depletion of valuable aquifers beyond the point of ever being replenished, unequal distribution by region and a tendency to concentrate investments on the development of new water resources (supply management) and to neglect demand management and water-saving strategy.

The population of Jordan is expected to be about 5.2 million at the end of 2002;
the number has a natural rate of growth of 2.8%, which is one of the highest growth rates in the world. About 38% are living in the capital city of Amman.

Jordan has invested heavily in the development of water management infrastructure to increase the production of drinking water with donors’ assistance.

Water Sector Policy Environment

In 1997 the government of Jordan embarked upon a privatization programme, the goal being to orient Jordan’s economy more towards the private sector and best present Jordan to the international financial community.

The specific objectives of the programme include increasing the efficiency of enterprises, consolidating public finance, attracting private investment into the economy and deepening the financial markets.

In response to a parliamentary request, the government developed a strategy for the privatization programme for appropriate situations, including management contracts and other privatization systems.

It has been noted that the major underlying and significant contributing factor
to the privatization success to date has been the emerging and unequivocal support at the highest level for privatization transactions.

As part of the privatization process promoted by the government of Jordan, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) has produced a number of key policy documents, including Jordan’s water policy, groundwater policy and water utility policy.

The Water Authority of Jordan

The Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ), created as a national government agency in 1988 by law 18/1988, is entrusted with the provision of water and wastewater services and the management of water resources. WAJ’s responsibilities include the monitoring of water sources, regulating groundwater use and providing water supply and sewage services for the entire Kingdom.

WAJ was set up as an autonomous corporate body with financial and administrative independence. In reality, however, civil service constraints were imposed, government procurement by-laws were followed and all activities were scrutinized by the central Audit Bureau and the Bureau of Supervision and Inspection.

Regarding domestic services, the country is divided into 12 administrative governments (as shown in Figure 2), each as an individual water authority. Each governorate was also set up as an autonomous unit, but due to the rigidity of laws and by-laws, ended up centrally managed, budgeted, staffed and so on.

The Water Situation in Jordan

The water supply in Jordan was in a state of emergency. The symptoms of this crisis were crippling the population of the governorate and WAJ and can be listed as follows:

• intermittent supply for many areas, sometimes lack of supply even over long periods, forcing people to take care of their own water storage and to buy water from external sources;
• tremendous costs for the production and distribution of water, equalling WAJ’s revenues;
• the absence of hydraulic engineering input;
• demand always exceeding the supply;
• a water shortage, which used to be acute in the summer period; this obliged WAJ to pump directly into the network with excessive pressures and leaving pipes empty for a long time;
• unaccounted for water (UFW) constituted nearly 50% of production.

The respective government authorities have of course been trying to address the above problems and alleviate the situation but have not always been successful in their attempts, mainly due to the lack of adequate financial resources.

Privatization Law

enhancing the private sector role in the economy to include those state enterprises that should be managed on a commercial basis.

Under this 2000 law, the Privatization Council is to decide on policies, enterprises, methods, consultants and contracts regarding privatization processes, subject to clearance by the Cabinet of Ministers. It also recommends the establishment of independent regulatory commissions for sectors subject to privatization.

This council is supported by a permanent agency, the Executive Privatization Commission (EPC). EPC is in charge of proposing and supervising the privatization processes in co-ordination with relevant agencies.

This is the statement of one of the articles in the law:

Article (3)

Privatization is defined as the adoption of an economic policy that enhances the role of the private sector in the national economy to include those particular public sector enterprises whose nature dictates that management should be based on a commercial basis. In this contest, privatization aims at:

a. Contributing to the attraction and flow of local, Arab and foreign
Table 1. Projected water demand up to 2020 of various sectors in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Municipal (MCM)</th>
<th>Industrial (MCM)</th>
<th>Agricultural (MCM)</th>
<th>Total (MCM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>1264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>1280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>1297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>1443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>1539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>1646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>1746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

investments by providing favorable investment and inductive environment.

b. Direct private savings towards long-term investment to strengthen and consolidate the internal capital market and the national economy.

c. Alleviate the debt burden of the Treasury through ceasing its financial commitments in terms of loans and grants for those projects deemed unsuccessful and unproductive.

d. Manage economic projects through modern techniques including the usage of developed technology to open up stable markets and to penetrate new markets by emphasizing its international competitiveness.

Water Demand Management

*Gap between Demand and Supply*

Although MWI proposed the investment programme for water through to 2011, Jordan will face a water deficit, which will grow up to 437 million cubic metres (MCM) by 2020. Table 1 and Figure 3 show the projected water demand of various sectors in Jordan, while Table 2 and Figure 4 show the total demand, total supply and total deficit up to 2020.

![Figure 3. Projected water demand in various sectors.](image-url)
Table 2. Total demand, available sources and deficit (MCM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total water demand</th>
<th>Total water supply</th>
<th>Total deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1264</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1297</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1443</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1646</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>1309</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The role of the private sector will be concentrated on decreasing the gap between limited water supply and increasing demand.

Revenue and Subsidy

The appointment of a private operation is fully consistent with the government of Jordan’s policies on public–private partnership (PPP) and utility management. Notwithstanding the commercialization of water services, the government recognizes the significant social obligations involved in the provision of water services. MWI is responsible for tariff determination and retains a ‘lifeline’ component for consumption up to 20 m³/quarter charged as one block regardless of consumption. The requirement limits price per cubic metre is significantly less than the cost of production. A reduced subsidy is achieved by charging a premium on water services to commerce and industry and on high-volume domestic consumption (as shown in Table 3). Table 3 shows the subsidy calculated for 2001.

Management Consideration re PPP

Sector Preparation

Once the decision to commercialize Amman Governorate Water Administration was taken, the Operations Management Support Project (OMS), sponsored by
Table 3. Cost, revenue and subsidy calculations for water and waste water for 2001 by block in Jordanian Dinar (JD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block Percentage of (m³)</th>
<th>Total cost (JD)</th>
<th>Total revenue (JD)</th>
<th>Subsidy (JD)</th>
<th>Subsidy Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–10</td>
<td>1 926 733</td>
<td>1 187 377</td>
<td>739 356</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–20</td>
<td>6 719 988</td>
<td>1 291 973</td>
<td>5 428 015</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21–30</td>
<td>12 205 392</td>
<td>1 769 943</td>
<td>10 435 449</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31–40</td>
<td>15 397 595</td>
<td>2 135 599</td>
<td>13 261 997</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–50</td>
<td>14 910 904</td>
<td>2 848 800</td>
<td>12 062 104</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51–60</td>
<td>11 453 835</td>
<td>2 950 230</td>
<td>8 503 605</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61–70</td>
<td>8 644 186</td>
<td>2 842 690</td>
<td>5 801 496</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71–80</td>
<td>6 282 791</td>
<td>2 544 664</td>
<td>3 738 127</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81–90</td>
<td>4 465 527</td>
<td>2 142 660</td>
<td>2 322 867</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91–100</td>
<td>3 568 649</td>
<td>2 012 293</td>
<td>1 556 356</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101–110</td>
<td>2 355 410</td>
<td>1 506 509</td>
<td>848 902</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111–120</td>
<td>1 777 996</td>
<td>1 290 612</td>
<td>487 384</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121–130</td>
<td>1 338 958</td>
<td>1 068 090</td>
<td>270 869</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131–140</td>
<td>1 046 753</td>
<td>966 368</td>
<td>80 386</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141–150</td>
<td>897 258</td>
<td>868 798</td>
<td>28 460</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151–200</td>
<td>2 627 251</td>
<td>2 758 013</td>
<td>–130 763</td>
<td>–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201–300</td>
<td>2 390 439</td>
<td>2 736 106</td>
<td>–345 667</td>
<td>–14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301–400</td>
<td>1 180 766</td>
<td>1 400 677</td>
<td>–219 912</td>
<td>–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401–500</td>
<td>722 082</td>
<td>870 756</td>
<td>–148 673</td>
<td>–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501–1000</td>
<td>1 695 891</td>
<td>2 097 566</td>
<td>–401 675</td>
<td>–24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001 or more</td>
<td>11 335 716</td>
<td>13 896 764</td>
<td>–2 561 048</td>
<td>–23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112 944 120</td>
<td>51 186 487</td>
<td>61 757 632</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Average water cost = 0.674 JD; average wastewater cost = 0.559 JD; 1 JD = US$1.5.

German Technical Cooperation, was one of those initiatives to tackle the problematic areas encountered in the water sector, concentrating mainly on Amman governorate during its first and second phases (April 1994–March 1999), and on Northern Governorates Water Administrations (NGWA) and Aqaba (as shown in Figure 2) in the third and fourth phase (April 1999–March 2002). During the fifth phase (April 2002–March 2006) it will continue the activities for NGWA and will move to the middle area of Jordan.

Potential bidders need to know about data and problems facing the governorates in order to bid for private sector participation (management contracts). Due to the incompleteness of the information, OMS activities have focused on the following:

- compiling and validating vital base data;
- creating local capacities to manage these data;
- improving the efficiency and reliability of core business such as water billing and accounting;
- improving information technology means of communication;
- preparing profit and loss statements;
- surveying subscribers’ locations through a project base data survey;
- managing and evaluating the assets;
- updating governorates’ maps, digitizing them on the computer, using geographic information systems for all technical operational and financial systems
for water and wastewater facilities and establishing network information systems;
• training and educating all the employees and establishing a vocational training centre;
• creating a pilot area to measure the UFW and finding ways to reduce it.

Options Considered

The government of Jordan through MWI started to study the options for privatizing the water sector by making a comparison between three options as shown in Table 4. It found that management contracts were the most appropriate system for Jordan.

Planning PPP in the Water Sector in Jordan

Management Contracts

The time has come to seek comprehensive solutions with immediate short-term effects as well as sustainable long-term benefits. Management contracts are a greatly expanded and more comprehensive form of service contract in which the private sector assumes responsibility for most or all of the public utility activities including operation, maintenance, billing and collection as well as day-to-day management with only limited and temporary delegation of authority to the public sector.

This approach was considered to be a good first step towards greater PPP. Management contracts for specific operations and management of facilities in Jordan’s water sector require no significant change in the existing regulatory or legal structure and therefore could be implemented quickly with relatively low costs and level of effort.

There are many different types of management contracts. The simplest involves paying a private firm a fixed fee for performing managerial tasks, while the more complex ones introduce greater incentives for efficiency by defining performance targets and basing the reward at least on their fulfilment.

Amman Management Contract

Contract awarding. The option was the running of Amman governorate by an international operator under a management contract for four years to implement a well-defined service improvement programme.

A team from MWI started to prepare the contract with a foreign legal and accounting consultant, to establish the figures for the base year. When the contract documents were ready, an issue of the request for proposals by WAJ was the formal invitation to the pre-qualified international firms (often in joint ventures with local firms) to submit offers. A total of 26 consortia purchased these documents, 10 of them offered their proposals and five firms or groups were pre-qualified and were invited to submit a response to this request for proposals.

A proposal conference was held at WAJ headquarters. The bidders who attended this conference asked several questions that were answered by the WAJ team and consultants, and a site visit was arranged for them.
Table 4. Comparison of main benefits and drawbacks for several private sector participation systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Main benefits</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1      | Service contracts | • Public sector gains access to private sector expertise for technical tasks for which it may lack expertise.  
  • Lead to improvements in efficiency.  
  • They are relatively simple and widely used  
  • Require no specific conditions; however, must be carefully managed and monitored. | • Will not improve a utility’s overall management  
  • Cannot eliminate or solve problems such as improperly designed tariff rates or poor cost recovery. |
| 2      | Management contracts | • Improve services with reduced risks to the client (i.e. government).  
  • Result in significant improvements in system operation efficiencies and services.  
  • Improve organizational reform of operations.  
  • Good first step towards significant private sector involvement in water supply and waste water. | • Government is responsible for the financing of all capital and part of operational investments. |
| 3      | Concessions       | • Responsibility for all the utility’s activities is transferred to the private developer.  
  • Efficiency improvements throughout the entire utility’s operations are maximized.  
  • Contracts are bid by price and can include targets and performance incentives. | • Arrangements are often complex.  
  • Require effective regulation and oversight.  
  • Long-term monopoly. |

During this period, just before offering the technical and financial proposals, only three consortia were interested in this project and only two of them submitted their proposals. MWI formed a special tendering committee to evaluate the technical proposals to accept them technically. After the evaluation of the financial proposals, the special tendering committee found that the consortium of the French company (Lyonnaise des Eaux), the British company (Montgomery Watson) and the Jordanian company (Arabtec Jardaneh), abbreviated to LEMA, was selected as the successful bidder on 19 April 1999. The contract was signed.
by WAJ and LEMA for four years starting from 31 July 1999. According to the contract LEMA has to manage, operate and maintain the water and wastewater facilities in the defined services area (as shown in Figure 5) of Amman the capital. The financing is as follows:

- fixed fee of about US$8.8 million for four years, which is for the services of the management staff;
- incentive fee (yearly); this is a fee for improved performance expressed and calculated in terms of increased cash flow from operation, and is equal to 5% of the incremental cash flow as defined in the contract (from WAJ).

**Lessons learned from the Amman management contract.** The management contract for the northern governorates should avoid the following problems, which arose from the Amman contract.

*Decision making.* The planning and management unit, representing WAJ in monitoring the operator, was not fully staffed at the beginning of the management contract and is not independent of the ministers, who tend to intervene in many aspects. This lack of staff and independence caused problems.

*Recruitment.* According to the Amman management contract, the private operator (LEMA) cannot transfer 50% of the personnel to WAJ over four years. After one year, WAJ refused to accept further transfers, contrary to the contract.
According to WAJ, this figure of 50% is too high. There should be other concepts for releasing personnel (compensation for dismissal, early retirement schemes, transfer of staff to subcontractors, etc.) and it must be guaranteed that the agreement on releasing personnel is fulfilled.

**Investment plans.** The planned reduction in water losses did not achieve the target; Capital Investment Greater Amman (US$210 million) was planned and has now started to be executed without any essential influence by LEMA, which wants its experience in the water and sewerage system and its priorities to be taken into account. At the end of the contract of four years, the reduction in the water losses due to the capital investment plan will be small or negligible.

**Cash management.** The cash received is not paid to the Amman management contractor, but paid to a WAJ account. To avoid the existing cash problems, the revenue should be paid directly to an account of the operator.

**Management fee, demand management and non-payment by customers.** The variable fee for the management contractor should be higher and be positively linked to the achievement of targets such as the reduction of water losses. These targets were unrealistically high in the Amman contract and the failure to achieve them was punished only by small fines. There should also be a positive incentive for creating demand management.

**Analysis of Recent Amman PPP Experience.**

**Institutional consideration.** The operator did, and is still doing, institutional building, training and technology transfer as per contract. Through technology transfer, the operator, with its international experience in water and wastewater utilities, brought new technologies and current ‘best practice’ related to the management of facilities.

**Legal consideration.** As a legal instrument the management contract provides a comprehensive document for administrating the interests of the contracting parties. This section deals only with the assignment of responsibilities as defined or implied in the contract; this section has aspects of the responsibilities of the operator, WAJ, MWI, the contract representative and the auditor.

**Economic considerations.** The interests of the customer were protected through ensuring efficient economic performance of the operator. This was done by the operator through water resources management, support of WAJ customer service policy and employment policy.

**Environmental and health considerations.** The operator has designed and implemented a comprehensive water quality-monitoring programme to ensure that public health and environmental requirements are fully protected.

**Northern Governorates Management Contract**

As part of Jordan government policy, MWI and WAJ have been considering options for water and wastewater services in the northern governorates of
Jordan (as shown in Figure 2) (Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun and Mafraq) and have concluded that a fixed-term management contract would currently be the best option. An international transaction advisor was assigned through bidding to study the situation in these governorates and prepare the documents for a contract for a period of six years and with potential for an extension of another two years to allow for sufficient time for the benefits of having a private operator to be fully realized. The transaction advisor started his work in February 2002 and the contract is expected to be awarded in August 2003.

The request for qualification was announced in local and international publications on 5–8 September 2002 and will be opened on 14 October 2002. A special steering committee was constituted to open the bids and form an evaluation committee for this bid to make a short list.

A request for proposals is being prepared by the transaction advisor. A technical committee will study and discuss these documents in an intensive week; then the short-listed firms have to purchase the documents and offer the technical and financial proposals.

Wadi Mousa Water and Wastewater Management Contract

MWI and WAJ extended their policy of privatization to Wadi Mousa, in the south of Jordan (see Figure 6), the municipality that serves and supports Petra within the Wadi Mousa area, Jordan's premier archaeological site and an important world heritage site.

WAJ proposed to enter into a contract with a private entity as a management contract for six years' duration with potential for an extension beyond that time to provide all services related to the management, operation and maintenance of the water and waste water serving communities in the Petra area district, which constitutes 14 villages with 49 hotels in the service area beside 6000 subscribers.

WAJ announced this contract for pre-qualification for local and joint ventures from international and local firms.

The tender was announced in May 2001; seven firms purchased the documents, and five of them were pre-qualified and were invited to submit a response to the request for proposals in October 2001. A steering committee was formed to evaluate the proposal in September 2001. A site visit was arranged and pre-bid conferences were held in November 2001. The new date for the opening of the proposals is 29 September 2002, and the awarding of the contract to the operator is expected to be at the end of 2003.

The basis of compensation will be a lump sum fixed fee plus an incentive fee related to performance of the operator; the contractor will not be responsible for any other costs related to capital improvement.

Aqaba Governmental Company

With the establishment of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority, WAJ is under pressure to provide adequate water supply and sewage disposal services to the fast-growing population and industrial/commercial customers.

Aqaba is the only profitable governorate among the 12 governorates that constitute Jordan (see Figure 2), mainly due to its favourable supply conditions and special customer composition, with the 10 largest customers contributing to more than 50% of billed consumption at the highest tariff group.
MWI and WAJ agreed to solve the problems through establishing a commercial governmental company for a limited period (maybe two to three years) and then as a shareholding company after that time.

Current Jordanian company law provides the legal framework and mechanism for transforming any governmental establishment into a public shareholding corporation. Legislators anticipated the need for transferring certain governmental functions to the private sector and provided this legal vehicle. A public shareholding company, established for this purpose, would at a later stage be put for public subscription, once its financial and commercial affairs were attractive to investors. The law provides for a transitional period in order for
such a government wholly owned company to improve its performance and enhance its financial situation in order to sell its shares in the market. The most important action that must be tackled is for the Council of Ministers to approve the establishment of the Aqaba company as a public shareholding company to take over the function of providing water distribution systems to customers in the Aqaba region.

Planning and Management Unit Establishment

MWI created its planning and management unit in 1997 to manage the implications of the Amman water sector improvement programme (and possibly at a later stage similar projects elsewhere in Jordan), to concentrate on preparation of the water supply, waste water and institutions for a higher level of private sector participation in the operation and maintenance of these systems and to develop managerial and regulatory capabilities which could be transferred to other WAJ governorate administrations. In the end the unit would be a regulatory body for PPP and private sector participation (PSP) involvement in the water and wastewater sector in Jordan, in order to plan and manage all activities related to the water sector, first in Amman governorate and later in other governorates.

Conclusion

The use of the management contract is considered to be a good first step towards greater PPP. Management contracts for specified operations and management of facilities in Jordan’s water sector would require no significant change in the existing regulatory or legal structure, and therefore could be implemented quickly with relatively low costs and level of effort.

The use of management contracts would not relieve the government of Jordan of the financial burden of capital investment. Thus if a management contract is to be used as a transitional vehicle, it must include specific measures to ensure that the next steps are taken. These measures might include triggers for reallocating risks and responsibilities once certain conditions have been met, a contract clause limiting renewal to avoid simply maintaining the status quo and the establishment of specific objectives which, when achieved, automatically initiate the next step in PPP.

MWI has been considering options for water and wastewater services in the northern governorates of Jordan (Irbid, Jerash, Ajloun and Mafraq) and Wadi Mousa and has concluded that a fixed-term management contract is currently the best option for each case.

The lessons learned from the Amman management contract were extremely helpful in ensuring that the contracts for the northern governorates and Wadi Mousa are structured and drafted to meet all objectives sought, and perform better than the Amman contract.

References
