Philosophy as Autobiography
Psychologistic, Reductive, & Non-Immanent Readings of Philosophy
Peter Suber, Philosophy Department, Earlham College Quotations
In chronological order
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford University Press, 1888 (original 1739).[p. 219] Several moralists have recommended it as an excellent method of becoming acquainted with our own hearts, and knowing our progress in virtue, to recollect our dreams in a morning, and examine them with the same rigour, that we wou'd our most serious and most deliberate actions. Our character is the same throughout, they say, and appears best where artifice, fear, and policy have no place, and men can neither be hypocrites with themselves nor others. The generosity, or baseness of our temper, our meekness or cruelty, our courage or pusilanimity, influence the fictions of the imagination with the most unbounded liberty, and discover themselves in the most glaring colours. In like manner, I am persuaded, there might be several useful discoveries made from a criticism of the fictions of the antient [sic] philosophy, concerning substances and substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities; which, however unreasonable and capricious, have a very intimate connexion with the principles of human nature.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), trans. Heath and Lachs, Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970 (original 1794, 1797).[p. 16] What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we accept or reject as we wish; it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person who holds it.
Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If', trans. C.K. Ogden, Routledge & Kegan Paul, second edition, 1935 (original composed 1877-82, published 1911).[p. 1] Scientific thought is a function of the psyche....Psychical actions and reactions are, like every event known to us, necessary occurrences; that is to say, they result with compulsory regularity from their conditions and causes.
[p. 7] [T]he organic function of thought is carried on for the most part unconsciously. Should the product finally enter consciousness also, or should consciousness momentarily accompany the processes of logical thought, this light only penetrates to the shallows, an the actual fundamental processes are carried on in the darkness of the unconscious. The specifically purposeful operations are chiefly, and in any case at the beginning, wholly instinctive and unconscious, even if they later press forward into the luminous circle of consciousness....
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber, with Stephen Lehmann, University of Nebraska Press, 1984 (original 1878).[§513] However far man may extend himself with his knowledge, however objective he may appear to himself ultimately he reaps nothing but his own biography.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Vintage, 1966 (original 1886).[§6] Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown.
Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does all this (does he) aim? Accordingly, I do not believe that a "drive to knowledge" is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has, here as elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere instrument....
In the philosopher [by contrast with the scientist] there is nothing whatsoever that is impersonal....
[§43] ..."My judgment is my judgment": no one else is easily entitled to it --that is what such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say of himself.
[§187] Even apart from the value of such claims as "there is a categorical imperative in us," one can still always ask: what does such a claim tell us about the man who makes it?
William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," The Will To Believe, Dover Publications, 1956 (original 1897).[p. 92] Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we form our philosophical opinions.
William James, Pragmatism, World Publishing Co., 1970 (original 1907).[p. 19] The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it,' in the philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability.
Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his temperament, to superior discernment or authority. There arises thus a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our premises is never mentioned.
Miguel de Unamuno. The Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J.E.C. Flitch, Macmillan, 1921; reprinted Dover Publications, 1954.[p. 2] In most of the histories of philosophy that I know, philosophic systems are presented to us as if growing out of one another spontaneously, and their authors, the philosophers, appear only as mere pretexts. The inner biography of the philosophers, of the men who philosophized, occupies only a secondary place. And yet it is precisely this inner biography that explains for us most things.
F.C.S. Schiller, "Must Philosophers Disagree?" in a collection of his essays of the same title, London, 1934; first published in 1933.[pp. 10-11] Actually every philosophy was the offspring, the legitimate offspring, of an idiosyncracy, and the history and psychology of its author had far more to do with its development than der Gang der Sache selbst....The naive student insists on viewing the system from the outside, as a logical structure, and not as a psychological process extending over a lifetime. And he thereby throws away, or loses, the key to understanding.
F.C.S Schiller, "Must Philosophy Be Dull?", Our Human Truths, Columbia University Press, 1939.[p. 98] Philosophy, then, will have the duty of tracing out the consequences of personality in all our knowing [because science will not do so]. Now as regards the philosophies, this task is easy enough: they all testify aloud to the often highly romantic personality of their makers, and the more original they are, the plainer it is that this is what has determined their every detail.
Robin Collingwood. Essay on Metaphysics, Henry Regnery Co., Gateway Edition, 1972 (original, 1939).[p. 48] People are not ordinarily aware of their absolute presuppositions..., and are not, therefore, thus aware of changes in them; such a change, therefore, cannot be a matter of choice. Nor is there anything superficial or frivolous about it....Why, asks my friend, do such changes happen? Briefly, because the absolute presuppositions of any given society, at any given phase of its history, form a structure which is subject to 'strains'....If the strains are too great, the structure collapses and is replaced by another, which will be a modification of the old with the destructive strain removed; a modification not consciously devised but created by a process of unconscious thought. (Cf. pp. 43, 76.)
Carl Gustav Jung, letter to Arnold Künzli, February 28, 1943, in C.G. Jung, Letters, vol. I: 1906-1950, Princeton University Press, 1973.[p. 331-32] For all its critical analysis philosophy has not yet managed to root out its psychopaths....Philosophy still has to learn that it is made by human beings and depends to an alarming degree on their psychic constitution. In the critical philosophy of the future there will be a chapter on 'The Psychopathology of Philosophy.' Hegel is fit to bust with presumption and vanity. Nietzsche drips with outraged sexuality, and so on. There is no thinking qua thinking, at times it is a pisspot of unconscious devils, just like any other function that lays claim to hegemony. Often what is thought is less important than who thinks it. But this is assiduously overlooked. Neurosis addles the brain of every philosopher because he is at odds with himself. His philosophy is then nothing but a systematized struggle with his own uncertainty.
John Oulton Wisdom, The Metamorphosis of Philosophy. Basil Blackwell, 1947.[p. 177] The statements of a speculative philosopher do not directly express facts about the universe but symptomatically express facts about himself they form his unconscious autobiography.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright, trans. Peter Winch, University of Chicago Press, 1980.[p. 20] It is sometimes said that a man's philosophy is a matter of temperament, and there is something in this. A preference for certain similes could be called a matter of temperament and it underlies far more disagreements than you might think.
Ernest Jones, Free Associations: Memoirs of a Psychoanalyst, Basic Books, 1959.[p. 60] [Philosophers are] people who have been impelled to deal with various personal problems in their unconscious by making serious efforts to think consciously; they have intellectualized the emotional conflicts.
John Lange, The Cognitivity Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Claims of Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1970.[p. 69] It seems reasonably clear that one's predispositions, however acquired, one's self-image, one's heroes, one's self-interests, etc., tend to affect the philosophical proposals to which one commits oneself. Such factors might even determine the proposals to which one commits oneself, but they presumably could not determine the set of proposals to which one should commit oneself.
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, NLB, first ed., 1975.[p. 45.n] Schizophrenics very often hold beliefs which are as rigid, all-pervasive, and unconnected with reality, as are the best dogmatic philosophies. However, such beliefs come to them naturally whereas a 'critical' philosopher may sometimes spend his whole life in attempting to find arguments which create a similar state of mind.
William Earle, "Philosophy as Autobiography," Public Sorrows and Private Pleasures, Indiana University Press, 1976.[pp. 173-74] Philosophy properly taken is the articulation in thought of one man's deepest concerns. Those concerns traditionally are named reality, truth, and the good, meaning of course that few persons seriously wish to become unreal, fraudulent, spurious beings themselves....The history of philosophy is the history, then, of the most profound choices men have made. If they talk as if a single, literal truth were at stake, were statable, that some approached it and others receded from it, or that there is a single line of general progress, it may be possible to understand these naive claims with some charity. Autobiographically understood, we see no more progress or development than we see among the various souls of whom these are the deepest confessions.
Jane Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchical Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics," in S. Harding and M. Hintikka (eds.), Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science. D. Reidel, 1983.[pp. 248-49] Thinking is a form of human activity which cannot be treated in isolation from other forms of human activity, including the forms of human activity which in turn shape the humans who think. Consequently philosophies will inevitably bear the imprint of the social relations out of which they and their creators arose....The very persistence and continuing importance of certain philosophies and philosophic issues can be treated as evidence of their congruence with fundamental social experiences and problems. Philosophy must at least resonate with central social and individual wishes and offer some solution to deeply felt problematics.
Agassi, Joseph, "The Zeitgeist and Professor Feuer," Philosophy of Social Science, 7 (Summer 1977) 251-253.
Alford, C. Fred. Narcissism: Socrates, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalytic Theory. Yale University Press, 1988.
[Aristotle] See: Roeder, E.
Ayers, M.R., "Reason and Psycholinguistics," in Renford Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom: Twelve Essays, Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 107-124. (On John Wisdom.)
Bartlett, Steven J., "Narcissism and Philosophy," Methodology and Science, 19 (1986) 16-26.
Bartlett, Steven J., "Psychological Underpinnings of Philosophy," Metaphilosophy, 20 (July/Oct. 1989) 295-305.
[Berkeley, George] See: Wisdom, J.O.
Boas, G., "The Role of Protophilosophies in Intellectual History," Journal of Philosophy, 45 (1948) 673-684.
Brearley, Mike, "Psycho-Analysis and Philosophy," in Ilham Dilman (ed.), Philosophy and Life: Essays on John Wisdom, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, pp. 179-200.
Britton, Karl, "About J.O. Wisdom's 'The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy'," Rev. Int. Phil., 8 (YEAR?) 470-72.
Bychowski, Gustav. Metaphysik und Schizophrenie. 1923
Child, Arthur, "Hiddenness: Simple Concealment and Disguise," Metaphilosophy, 1 (July 1970) 223-257. (On Heidegger, Lazerowitz, Freud.)
Cohen, Avner, "Certainty, Doubt and Anxiety: Towards a Theory of the Psychology of Metaphysics," Metaphilosophy, 12 (1981) 113-144.
Cohen, Avner, "Descartes, Consciousness and Depersonalization: Viewing the History of Philosophy From a Strausian Perspective," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 9 (Feb. 1984) 7-27.
Cohen, Avner. Doubt, Anxiety and Salvation: A Study of Metaphilosophical and Psychological Themes in the History of Scepticism. Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Committee on History of Culture, University of Chicago, 1981.
Cohen, Avner, "Kierkegaard as a Psychologist of Philosophy," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 13 (1982) 103-119.
Cohen, Avner, "Scepticism And Angst: The Case Of David Hume," Manuscrito, 11 (Oct. 1988) 49-66.
Cole, John R. The Olympian Dreams and Youthful Rebellion of René Descartes. University of Illinois Press, 1992.January 5, 2000
Crittenden, Charles, "Wittgenstein on Philosophical Therapy and Understanding," International Philosophical Quarterly, 10 (1970) 20-43.
[Descartes, René] See: Cohen, A.; Cole, J.R.; Feuer, L.S.; Franz, M. von; Freud, S.; Galdston, I; Jones, W.T.; Lewin, B.D.; Maritain, J.; Rittmeister, J; Scharfstein, B.-A.; Schönberger, S.; Wisdom, J.O.
[Dewey, John] See: Settanni, H.
Earle, William, "Philosophy as Autobiography," Chapter 10 of his Public Sorrows and Private Pleasures, Indiana University Press, 1976.
Ebstein, Wilhelm. Arthur Schopenhauer: Seine wirklichen und vermeintlichen Krankheiten. Stuttgart, 1907
Eiduson, B.T. Scientists: Their Psychological World. Basic Books, 1962.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Anxiety and Philosophy: The Case of Descartes," American Imago, 20 (1963) 411-49.
Feuer, Lewis S., "The Dreams of Descartes," American Imago, 20 (1963) 3-26.
Feuer, Lewis S., Einstein and the Generations of Science, Basic Books, 1974.
Feuer, Lewis S., "God, Guilt and Logic: The Psychological Basis of the Ontological Argument," Inquiry, 11 (1968) 257-281.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Karl Marx and the Promethean Complex," Encounter, 31, 6 (1968) 15-32.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Lawless Sensations and Categorial Defenses: The Unconscious Sources of Kant's Philosophy," in Hanly and Lazerowitz (eds.). q.v.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Rejoinder on 'The Role of Sexuality in the Formation of Ideas'," J Ind Psychology, 17 (1961) 110-11.
Feuer, Lewis S. The Scientific Intellectual: The Psychological and Sociological Origins of Modern Science. Basic Books, 1963.
[Feuer, Lewis S.] See: Agassi, J.; Sessions, W.L.; Watt, E.D.
Flax, Jane, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchical Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics," in S. Harding and M. Hintikka (eds.), Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science. D. Reidel, 1983.
Franz, Marie von, "The Dream of Descartes," in Timeless Documents of the Soul, Evanston, Illinois, 1968, pp. 55-147; originally "Zeitlose Dokumente der Zeele," Studien aus dem Jung-Institut, 3 (1952).
[Frege, Gottlieb] See: Kusch, M.
Freud, Sigmund, "Some Dreams of Descartes," in The Standard Edition of the Writing of Sigmund Freud, vol. 21 (1953) pp. 203-204.
Galdston, Iago, "Descartes and Modern Psychiatric Thought," Isis, 35 (1944) 118-28.
Gomperz, Heinrich. Psychologische Beobachtungen an grieschischen Philosophen. 1924.
[Hamann] See: Schmitz, F.J.
Hanly, Charles, and Morris Lazerowitz (eds.). Psychoanalysis and Philosophy. International Universities Press, 1970.
[Hegel, G.W.F.] See: Künzli, A.; Settanni, H.
[Heidegger, Martin] See: Child, A.
Helfaer, Philip M. The Psychology of Religious Doubt. Beacon Press, 1972.
Herzberg, Alexander. The Psychology of Philosophers. Trans. Eustace Bernard Foley Wareing, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929.
Hitschmann, Eduard, "Schopenhauer, Versuch einer Psychoanalyse des Philosophen" Imago, Leipzig, II, ii (1913) 101-74; reprinted in his Great Men: Psychoanalytic Studies, "Schopenhauer: Attempt at the Psychoanalysis of a Philosopher," International Universities Press, 1956, pp. 25-125, translated by Sidney G. Margolin.
Hitschmann, Eduard, "Swedenborg's Paranoia," American Imago, 1949; reprinted in his Great Men: Psychoanalytic Studies, International Universities Press, 1956, pp. 225-231.
[Hume, David] See: Cohen, A.
[Husserl, Edmund] See: Kusch, M.
Jaspers, Karl. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. 1919; reprinted, Springer-Verlag, 1971.
Joad, C.E.M., "Thought and Temperament," Essay VII (pp. 219-52) of his Essays in Common Sense Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin, 1919.
Jones, W.T., "Somnio Ergo Sum: Descartes's Three Dreams," Philosophy and Literature, 4 (Fall 1980) 145-66.
Juliusburger, O., "Psychotherapie und die Philosophie Schopenhauers," Zentralblatt für Psa., III (1912).
[Kant, Immanuel] See: Feuer, L.S.; Loewenberg, R.D.; Schott, R.M.; Settanni, H.; Vaihinger, H.
Künzli, Arnold, "Prolegomena zu einer Psychographie Hegels," in G.-K. Kaltenbrunner (ed.), Hegel und die Folgen, Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1970.
Kusch, Martin. Psychologism: A Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge, 1995. (On Frege and Husserl.)
[Lazerowitz, Morris] See: Child, A.; Hanly, C.
Lecercle, Jean-Jacques. Philosophy Through the Looking Glass: Language, Nonsense, Desire. Open Court, 1985.
[Lessing, G.E.] See: Schmitz, F.J.
Levi, A.W., "The 'Mental Crisis' of John Stuart Mill," The Psychoanalytic Review, 5 (1945) 86-101.
Lewin, Bertram D. Dreams and the Uses of Regression. New York, 1958. (Contains an analysis of Descartes' dreams.)
Loewenberg, R.D., "Kant's Self-Analysis," American Imago, 10 (1953) 307-22; reprinted in The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis, 10 (1955).
Maritain, Jacques. The Dream of Descartes, Together With Some Other Essays. Trans. Mabelle L. Andison. Philosophical Library, 1944.
[Marx, Karl] See: Feuer, L.S.
[Mill, John Stuart] See: Levi, A.W.; Sawyier, F.H.; Settanni, H.; Wilson, F.
Miller, Alice. The Untouched Key. Doubleday, 1988. (On Nietzsche.)
[Mournier, Immanuel] See Settanni, H.
Müller-Freienfels, Richard. Persönlichkeit und Weltanschauung. 1919.
Newman, Jay, "The Unconscious Origins of Philosophical Inquiry," Philosophical Forum, 9 (Summer 1978) 409-428. (Argues against the psychologistic readings, esp. against Herzberg, Lazerowitz, Wisdom, Feuer, and Collingwood.)
[Nietzsche, Friedrich] See: Miller, A.; Sondag, Y.
Pfister, O. Zur Psychologie des philosophischen Denkens. Bern: Bircher, 1923.
Pieter, Jozef, "Problems and Methods of the Psychology of Philosophizing," Dialectics and Humanism, 2 (Autumn 1975) 151-166.
Rittmeister, John, "Die Mystische Krise des jungen Descartes," Confinia psychiatrica, 4 (1961) 65-98; reprinted in Zeitschrift für psychosomatische Medezin und Psychoanalyse, 15 (1969) 206-24.
Roeder, Egenolf, "Das Ding an Sich," Imago, Leipzig, IX, iii (1923) 273-99. (On Aristotle.)
Sawyier, Fay Horton, "Philosophy as Autobiography: John Stuart Mill's Case," Philosophy Research Archives, XI (March 1986) 169-180.
Scharfstein, Ben-Ami, "Descartes' Dreams," Philosophical Forum, 3 (1969) 306-323.
Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. The Philosophers: Their Lives and the Nature of their Thought. Basil Blackwell, 1980.
Scharfstein, Ben-Ami, and Mortimer Ostow, "The Need to Philosophize," in Hanly and Lazerowitz (eds.), q.v.
Scharfstein, Ben-Ami, and Mortimer Ostow, "The Unconscious Sources of Spinoza's Philosophy," American Imago, 9 (1952) 221-37.
Schmitz, Friedrich Joseph. The Problem of Individualism and the Crises in the Lives of Lessing and Hamann. University of California Press, 1944.
Schönberger, Stephen, "A Dream of Descartes: Reflections on the Unconscious Determinants of the Sciences," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 20 (1939) 43-57.
[Schopenhauer, Arthur] See: Ebstein, W.; Hitschmann, E.; Juliusburger, O.; Sedlitz, C.; Sondag, Y.; Wisdom, J.O.
Schott, Robin May. Cognition and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm. Beacon Press, 1988.
Schreber, D.P. Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken. Dresden, 1903.
Schuster, Shlomit C. The Philosopher's Autobiography: A Qualitative Study. Praeger Publishers, 2003.
Sedlitz, C. von. Dr. Arthur Schopenhauer vom medizinischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet. Dorpat, 1872.
Sessions, William Lad, "Feuer, Psychology, and the Ontological Argument," Inquiry, 12 (Winter 1969) 431-434.
Settanni, Harry. Five Philosophers: How Their Lives Influenced Their Thought. University Press of America, 1992.
[Socrates] See: Alford, C.F.
Sondag, Yves, "Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, L'Ascetisme et la Psychanalyse," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, CLXI (1971) 347-359.
Spicker, Stuart, "The Psychiatrist as Philosopher," in H.T. Engelhardt and S.F. Spicker (eds.), Mental Health: Philosophical Perspectives, D. Reidel, 1977.
[Spinoza, Baruch] See: Scharfstein, B.-A. and Ostow, M.
Straus, Erwin, "Psychiatry and Philosophy," in Maurice Natanson (ed.), Psychiatry and Philosophy, Springer-Verlag, 1969, pp. 1-83.
[Swedenborg, Emmanuel] See: Hitschmann, E.
Thornburn, John MacCaig. Art and the Unconscious: A Psychological Approach to a Problem of Philosophy. Kegan Paul, 1925.
Vaihinger, Hans, "Kant als Melancholiker," Kantstudien, 2 (1898) 139-41.
Wallraff, Charles F. Philosophical Theory And Psychological Fact: An Attempt At Synthesis. University of Arizona Press, 1961.
Watt, E.D., "Feuer on Guilt and Logic," Inquiry, 12 (Winter 1969) 427-430.
Wilson, Fred. Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. University of Toronta Press, 1990.
Winterstein, Alfred von, "Psychoanalytische Anmerkungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie," Imago, Leipzig, II, ii (1913) 175-237.
Wisdom, John Oulton. The Metamorphosis of Philosophy. Basil Blackwell, 1947. (Esp. Part III.)
Wisdom, John Oulton. The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy. London: The Hogarth Press, The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953.
Wisdom, John Oulton, "The Unconscious Origin of Schopenhauer's Philosophy," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, London, 26 (1945) 44-52.
Wisdom, John Oulton, "Three Dreams of Descartes," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, London, 28 (1947) 11-18.
[Wisdom, John Oulton] See: Britton, K.
Wisdom, John. Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, Basil Blackwell, 1964. (Note that this is not the same John Wisdom of the immediately preceding citations.)
[Wisdom, John] See: Ayers, M.R.; Brearly, M.
[Wittgenstein, Ludwig] See: Crittenden, C.
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Peter Suber, Department of Philosophy, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, 47374.
firstname.lastname@example.org. Copyright © 1999-2003, Peter Suber.